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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN MACEDONIA – MICRO AND 
MACRO ANALYSIS 
 
Mico Apostolov* 
 
Abstract 
 
The corporate governance issue in Macedonian companies has been brought forward during the recent few 
years. The main reason is the fact that the privatization process completion of socially-owned and partly 
state-owned enterprises has put emphasis to the challenge to reasonably regulate relationships established 
within companies on one hand, and relationships between companies and larger society on the other. All 
market economies, including those with longest tradition, have faced this kind of challenge so far. 
Corporate governance becomes an increasingly important issue for the Macedonian economy. It is being 
taken with greater consideration by the companies, regulators and government. The strong wave of 
privatization programs from mid-90’ have resulted in an altered business environment, and new legal and 
institutional frameworks have been established. Indeed, corporate governance contributes to sustainable 
economic development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to 
external sources of capital. In this paper we will make attempt to analyze the predominant factors that 
create prolific corporate governance environment in two terms; a) micro level and macro level.  
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Introduction  
This paper is concerned with corporate governance 
and enterprise restructuring through a measure of 
management‘s capabilities to act in the best interest of 
shareholders, as well as, the mechanisms that trigger 
managerial behavior needed to augment the wealth of 
the enterprise i.e. the stewardship and enterprise 
dimensions. The specific characteristics of the 
economies in transition give research ground for 
different models analyzing the effects of governance 
and organizational capabilities for restructuring. The 
economy of Macedonia has been characterized by 
high level of changes in the ownership structure and 
business environment turbulence. There are studies 
that specifically analyze the changes in the ownership 
structure and business environment turbulence, which 
will be used in this article (Robert E. Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; N. Uhlenbruck & Castro, 
1998).   
 
The already established transition economic 
theory gives evidence that the privatization of 
formerly state-owned companies is not fallowed with 
performance improvements as default guarantee 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Further, the literature 
suggests that it is needed replacement of the 
management and introduction of several governance 
mechanisms, if wanted grater performance of newly 
privatized enterprises (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).  
Indeed, the studies analyzing governance and 
enterprise restructuring in transition economies 
suggest that evolving corporate governance is crucial 
for the outcome of firm restructuring (Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002; Igor Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 
2000). Thus, it is evident that different methods of 
privatization (management-employee buyouts, gave-
aways, tying to strategic foreign investors, etc.) 
require different governance. 
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Due to the nature of the transition process 
these markets have different settings and attributes 
when compared to developed national economies 
(Robert E.  Hoskisson, Johnson, Yiu, & Wan, 2006). 
The learning process of the corporate governance in 
post-communist economies is characterized by the 
need of developing the monitoring systems, as well 
as, tuning managers to respect and satisfy the needs of 
the shareholders (I.  Filatotchev, Hoskisson, Buck, & 
Wright, 1996), which is creating new ‗rules of the 
game‘(Douglass Cecil North, 1990; Douglass C. 
North, 1994). Hence, the weight of transformation 
and enterprise restructuring falls on the quality of 
managers and their capabilities to learn the new rules 
of the game (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Steensma & Lyles, 
2000).    
The research hypotheses are: 
1
st
 Hypothesis i.e. Micro Level: domestic versus 
foreign owners, companies are driven by foreign 
owners; 
2
nd
 Hypothesis i.e. Macro Level: governance and 
enterprise restructuring is influenced by gross 
domestic product and foreign direct investments 
dynamics. 
 
Theoretical and literature framework  
1. The transition economy literature 
The planned economies‘ management based 
on the principles of theoretical ground of the political 
ideology at that time when national economies were 
characterized by state-owned property inducing acute 
inefficiencies of firms, thus also on overall macro 
level (Kornai, 1992). This resulted with incapability 
to increase efficiency of the firms and make their 
products competitive in regional and international 
business environment (Sachs, Warner, Åslund, & 
Fischer, 1995). The process of privatization was 
imposed as to introduce sociopolitical change and 
improve macroeconomic benefits, as well as, ‗restart‘ 
the state-owned companies by imposing market 
managerial mechanisms (Megginson & Netter, 2001)  
There has been variation of different modes 
of privatization that were imposed while restructuring 
from planned to functional market economies, and 
there is sufficient literature bases that suggest 
different mode of privatization lead to different 
governance outcomes (EBRD, 1994-2009; Estrin & 
Wright, 1999; Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 
2000)  
2. Problems of governance in transition 
economies 
There are studies that link enterprise 
restructuring with governance features, such as board 
attributes and ownership structure (for example, 
(Bergh, 1995; Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Djankov & 
Murrell, 2002; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). 
The specificities of each separate country contribute 
to explanations of enterprise restructuring, such as 
development of market institutions, government 
involvement, ownership patterns, industry structures 
and enforcement of business laws. During the 
restructuring phase important hybrid organizational 
forms took place i.e. so-called ‘recombinant 
properties‘, which represent recombination of 
property, thus distorting the boundary between public 
and private ownership (Peng & Heath, 1996; Spicer, 
McDermott, & Kogut, 2000; Stark, 1996). The 
variations in enterprise restructuring outcomes could 
be caused by managerial opportunisms which are not 
controlled by the owners; hence this is likely to be a 
consequence of board composition, legal enforcement 
(the lack of it) and weak capital market (Igor 
Filatotchev et al., 2000; Wright, Buck, & Filatotchev 
). Thus, the governance problems most often are 
caused by inadequate monitoring of managers or 
because they have acquired too much ownership due 
bending the transition process (Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny; Newman, 2000; Whitley & Czaban, 1998) .  
3. Apprenticing and competences 
One of the most important problems that 
transition economies are faced with is the lack of 
capital and new ways of acquiring finances, moreover 
because the capital markets are not well developed 
and there is no sufficient protection to foreign and 
minority investors (EBRD, 1994-2009). 
Consequently, the enterprise restructuring in all its 
organizational characteristics turns around learning 
and fortification of market competencies (Lyles & 
Salk, 1996; K. Uhlenbruck, Meyer, & Hitt, 2003). 
The ‗ability to change‘ as a function of ﬁrm‘s 
resources is essential to enterprise restructuring 
(Barker Iii & Duhaime, 1997), especially in an 
environment where they have very limited absorptive 
capacity i.e. the ability ‗to recognize the value of new 
information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends‘ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This is quite vital 
as it provides firms with strategic flexibility to assume 
good positions in constantly changing and turbulent 
transition environment (Puffer, McCarthy, & 
Peterson, 2001). 
Indeed, the absorptive capacity and the 
ability to adopt and further build competitive 
capacities depends on prior knowledge, which in 
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transition economies is estimated to be significantly 
low (Newman, 2000) 
4. Governance and upgrade of 
competences  
The constrains that inflict enterprise 
restructuring are usually lack of effective governance 
mechanisms, as well as, managerial inability to adopt 
to changes (Mahoney, 1995). However, it is evident 
that managerial abilities may get better due time, but 
these improvements are usually lagging behind the 
pace of change in the business environment. Thus, 
effective corporate governance can influence 
managers to improve and increase the overall strategic 
flexibility of the firm towards undertaking the 
necessary restructuring (Hitt, Ireland, & Hoskisson, 
2009; Robert E. Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; 
Johnson, 1996). 
In the  analytical framework used by 
Filatotchev, Wright, Hoskisson et al. there are two 
basic dimensions of governance modes: insider and 
outsider governance modes  (Igor Filatotchev, Wright, 
Uhlenbruck, Tihanyi, & Hoskisson, 2003).  
The insider governance mode is 
characterized by governance mechanisms imposed by 
dominant ownership management and employees and 
outsider governance mode is associated to dominance 
of ownership from investors outside of the firm 
(mainly foreign investors)(Hitt et al., 2009; Robert E. 
Hoskisson et al., 2000; Puffer et al., 2001). The other 
two dimensions are low or high absorptive capacity 
that indicate the capability of the firm to upgrade its 
competences due time and competitive pressures (Igor 
Filatotchev et al., 2003) :
  
                                 Insider governance Outsider governance 
Learning—
low 
absorptive 
capacity 
Quadrant 1: Stuck privatization  
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Managerial incentives reduced in absence of 
purchase 
 Low managerial turnover  
 Resistance to outside board members  
 Entrenchment of traditional networks  
 Low learning and weak governance  
 
 
 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of low corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
Quadrant 2: Privatization to domestic institutions 
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Managerial incentives but poor wealth diversification lead 
to low risk behavior 
 Monitoring by outside investors 
 Limited access to outside networks 
 Important role of bank-led financial-industrial groups 
producing financial reallocation but also private 
appropriation 
 Ambiguous efficiency of governance, may be traded off 
for low learning 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of moderate corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
Learning—
high 
absorptive 
capacity 
Quadrant 3: Privatization buy-outs  
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Managerial incentives  
 Passive monitoring by financiers  
 Limited access to outside networks  
 High learning is traded off for weak governance 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of moderate corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
Quadrant 4: Privatization to foreign investors 
 
Organizational characteristics: 
 Effective boards 
 Managerial turnover 
 Break-out from traditional networks 
 High learning complements high efficiency 
governance 
 
Strategic outcomes: 
 Likelihood of high corporate restructuring 
effectiveness 
 
Figure 1. Corporate governance and learning capacity 
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Analytical Framework 
1. Sample selection and Data 
The first assumption will be analyzed on the 
bases of a survey on shareholders in Macedonia, with 
an emphasis on their rights (the level of 
acknowledgement of their rights, the level and 
manner of practicing of their rights, their involvement 
in the company‘s decision making), conducted by 
USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA)
100
 .  
Since there has been a major development of 
the capital market in Macedonia, increase of the 
knowledge of investors and the broader public, this 
survey is a more comprehensive research and 
provides a more general picture of the shareholders‘ 
structure, with an emphasis on (the level of) 
incorporation of good Corporate Governance 
practices in the companies, especially the Joint Stock 
Companies. The principal players are the 
shareholders, management and the board of directors. 
The second estimation is based on data 
provided by the data bases of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition 
report series (EBRD, 1994-2009), the World Bank 
Database
101
 and the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia
102
 and Macedonian Stock Exchange
103
. 
The indicator of GDP is measuring growth in real 
GDP (in per cent) for the time period of 1989 to 2009 
(with exceptions for the years where data was not 
available, which is minor) and the indicator of FDI‘s 
is measuring foreign direct investment as net inflows 
recorded in the balance of payments.  
2. Model and Econometrics  
a) First hypothesis analytical framework 
The first hypothesis is that companies are driven by 
foreign owners which puts domestic versus foreign 
owners, and it is tightly connected with the second 
hypothesis. In order to get good results and more 
complete research, this first hypothesis is analyzed 
qualitatively. Thus, the approach taken is concerned 
with the micro level of Macedonian economy i.e. 
                                                 
100
 USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA). Available at 
:[ http://www.bea.org.mk/ ] 
101
 World Bank Database, Available at: [ 
http://data.worldbank.org/ ] 
102
 National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. Available at:  
[ http://www.nbrm.gov.mk/ ] 
103
 Macedonian Stock Exchange. Available at:  [ 
http://www.mse.org.mk/ ] 
 
examination on the origin of dominant owners and the 
impact each category has to directing the firm 
structure therefore giving favorable outcomes. 
b) Second hypothesis analytical framework 
The econometric model (Freedman, 2005) that is used 
for the second hypothesis is a regression model where 
we have estimated the fallowing equation: 
 
ipipio xxi   ...11    (1)   
 
ni ,...1    (2) 
Thus, applied to our research this model has the 
fallowing shape: 
 
tititioti FDIGDPGOV ,,2,1,  
(3) 
 where the dependent variable, 
tiGOV , , shows 
governance and enterprise restructuring;  
 the independent variables, are as follows :  
1. 
tiGDP,  gross domestic product;  
2. 
tiFDI ,  foreign direct investments;  
   is a p-dimensional parameter vector ;  
  is the error term or noise. 
 
Results and Effects 
1. Results on the first hypothesis i.e. Micro 
Level 
The numbers taken from the IFC‘s Corporate 
Governance Manual for Macedonian companies and 
the survey of USAID/Business Environment Activity 
(BEA)
104
  are valid until 2008 and were retrieved 
from the Central Depositary
105
. The number of Joint 
Stock Companies at that time was 577, with total 
number of shareholders 174 870. Thus, largest type of 
holders is the domestic individuals (95.64%), 
followed by domestic legal entities (2.43%). The 
foreign individuals form a group of 1.43% and the 
smallest is the group of foreign legal entities with 
0.45% of shares in the Macedonian joint stock 
companies (IFC, 2008). 
 
                                                 
104
 USAID/Business Environment Activity (BEA). Available at 
:[ http://www.bea.org.mk/ ] 
105
 Central Depositary [http://www.cdhv.org.mk/] 
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On the other hand, if we observe the number 
of shares that are owned by various types of owners 
we get completely different picture, which confirms 
the first hypothesis in this study. Hence, more than 
half (56.68%) of the shares in the Macedonian joint 
stock companies are owned by the foreign legal 
entities. This group is followed by domestic legal 
entities which own 34.23% of all shares in the 
country, and at the end there are domestic and foreign 
individual owners who hold in total less than 10% of 
the shares in the Macedonian joint stock companies 
(IFC, 2008).   
These values are well portrayed in the figures 
below, where it is found evidence for the first 
hypothesis i.e. most of the valuable and important 
Macedonian joint stock companies, that in essence 
form the Macedonian economy, are indeed driven by 
foreign owners. 
The fact that more than half of the shares in 
the Macedonian joint stock companies are owned by 
foreign legal entities is connected to the movements 
in foreign direct investment and thus to the second 
hypothesis. Furthermore, it is evidence of dispersion 
of shareholding by domestic owners against 
concentration of control of foreign entities. This also 
shows that most of the enterprise restructuring, 
learning and apprenticing of new capacities and 
capabilities, hence improving corporate governance 
and governance of the economy in general, comes 
from foreign input. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of shares by type of holder 
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Figure 3. Percentage of the number of shares by type of holder 
 
2. Results on the second hypothesis i.e. 
Macro Level  
The results on the second hypothesis are shown in the 
tables below. The second hypothesis assumes that 
governance and enterprise restructuring is influenced 
by gross domestic product and foreign direct 
investments dynamics. Further, the study produced 
correlation matrix and OLS regression analysis 
results. 
 
GOV GDP FDI
GOV 1
GDP 0.8327 1
FDI 0.6936 0.4835 1
 
 Figure 4. Correlation Matrix on GOV for GDP and FDI – Macedonia 
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OLS
Dependent Variable
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
Independent 
Variable  Macedonia
GDP 0.0741883
[0.0140246]***
FDI 0.0010187
[0.0003291]***
Constant 1.859174
[0.0845265]***
Observations 63
R-squared 0.8039
Adjusted R-
squared 0.7808
Time period 1989-2009
Significance Level: *** p < 0.01   ** p < 0.05   * p < 0.1
Standard errors are in parentheses.
 
 
Figure 5. OLS on GOV for GDP and FDI – Macedonia   
 
 
The OLS analysis is rather basic and it has 
the purpose to indicate and support the first 
hypothesis. The results of the OLS regression 
explaining the link between GOV and GDP, FDI are 
given in the figures describe the relationships and 
movements between these variables.  
The GDP results are significant for both 
GDP and FDI (p < 0.01). It is clear from the figures 
that governance and enterprise restructuring is 
positively influenced by gross domestic product and 
especially foreign direct investments dynamics. 
 
 However, it must be said that deeper 
econometric analysis might bring different light to the 
way separate segments of these variables contribute to 
governance and enterprise restructuring. Hence, the 
business aspect of analysis introduced to this paper 
gives rather satisfactory picture of the positive impact 
that foreign investments give to the business 
environment, as well as, their dominance in 
ownership shareholding which eventually impacts the 
process of learning, capabilities building and 
apprenticing from foreign boards and investors.  
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Figure 6. GDP in GOV – Macedonia 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. FDI in GOV – Macedonia 
 
Discussion 
 
The first analysis gave results that more than 
half of the shares in the Macedonian joint stock 
companies are controlled by the foreign legal entities. 
The analysis of the second hypothesis showed to be 
significant for foreign direct investments. Hence, it 
can be said that the ownership structure is connected 
to the movements in foreign direct investment and 
thus to the second hypothesis. This also confirms the 
premise that domestic ownership is dispersed and the 
control is given to foreign entities, where the influx of 
new capacities and capabilities pushed by foreign 
ownership increases the learning and apprenticing 
process of the firm. 
The basic examination of foreign direct 
investment variable, gross domestic product variable 
and governance and enterprise restructuring variable 
indicates that governance and enterprise restructuring 
is positively influenced by gross domestic product and 
especially foreign direct investments dynamics. 
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 The format of study and the business aspect 
of the research give acceptable results of the impact 
that foreign investment to the business environment, 
as well as, the dominance of ownership shareholding 
which eventually impacts the process of learning, 
capabilities building and apprenticing from foreign 
boards and investors.  
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